


Concurrent reachability

$$G = \langle S, M, T_1, T_2, P \rangle$$

$$R \subseteq S$$



$$\langle 1 \rangle \Diamond R = \sup_{\pi_1} \inf_{\pi_2} P_{\pi_1, \pi_2}(\Diamond R)$$

Valuation: $v: S \mapsto R$ (or $S \mapsto [0, 1]$)

Pointwise operations:

$$V = S \mapsto R \text{ (all valuations)}$$

$$v_1, v_2 \in V$$

$$v_1 + v_2 \text{ as}$$

$$(v_1 + v_2)(s) = v_1(s) + v_2(s)$$

$$v_1 \sqcup v_2 \text{ as } (v_1 \sqcup v_2)(s) = v_1(s) \sqcup v_2(s)$$

$$v_1 \leq v_2 \text{ iff } \forall s: v_1(s) \leq v_2(s)$$

$$v_1 < v_2 \text{ iff } v_1 \leq v_2 \text{ and } \exists s \in S. v_1(s) < v_2(s).$$

We want to shift thinking from value sets of states to valuations.

For TSS, $[T]: S \mapsto \mathbb{R}$

$$[T](s) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } s \in T \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

LEAST

$$0 = \lambda s. 0 = \text{the function } f \text{ st. } f(s) = 0 \forall s \in S.$$

$$1 = \lambda s. 1$$

GREATEST valuation.

(V, \leq) is a complete lattice.

Set-based reachability.

$$X_0 = \emptyset$$

$$X_1 = R$$

$$X_2 = R \cup \text{Pre}_1(R)$$

$$X_3 = R \cup \text{Pre}_1(X_2)$$

⋮

Now, with probabilities:

$$X_0 = \emptyset$$

$$X_1 = [R]$$

$$X_2 = [R] \sqcup P\text{Pre}_1([R])$$

$$X_3 = [R] \sqcup P\text{Pre}_1(X_2)$$



$P\text{Pre}_1(X)$ is the
max. expectation of X
I can guarantee in 1 step.

In a turn-based game,

$$[Pre, (X)] = PPre, ([X])$$

For a turn-based game,

$$\begin{aligned} & [\mu X. (Pre, (X) \cup R)] \\ &= \mu X. (PPre, (X) \sqcup [R]) \end{aligned}$$

Thus, $\mu X. ([R] \sqcup PPre, (X))$ (1)


gives the max prob. of winning a reachab. game at least for turn-based games.

Can we show (1) works also for concurrent games?

Yes. See later.

Example

on a stochastic turn-based game.



X_0	s_1	s_2	s_0
X_0	0	0	1

$X_1 = [R]$	0	0	1
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$X_2 = \text{PPre}(X_1) \cup [R]$

X_2	<u>$\frac{1}{2}$</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>
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- a \rightsquigarrow $\frac{1}{2}$ ●
- b \rightsquigarrow $\frac{1}{3}$
- c \rightsquigarrow 0 ●
- d \rightsquigarrow $\frac{2}{3}$

s_1 s_2 s_0

6

$$X_3 = \text{PPre}_1(X_2) \cup \{\bar{R}\}$$

$$X_3 = \begin{array}{ccc} \underline{\frac{2}{3}} = \nu_3(s_1) & \underline{\frac{1}{4}} = \nu_3(s_2) & \underline{1} \\ a \rightsquigarrow \frac{1}{2} & c \rightarrow \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{2} & \bullet \\ \otimes b \rightsquigarrow \frac{1}{3} + \frac{2}{3} \cdot \frac{1}{2} & d \rightsquigarrow \frac{2}{3} & \end{array}$$

$$= \frac{2}{3}$$

$$X_4 = \text{PPre}_1(X_3) \cup \{\bar{R}\}$$

$$X_4 = \begin{array}{ccc} \underline{\frac{7}{9}} & \underline{\frac{1}{3}} & \underline{1} \\ a \rightarrow \frac{1}{2} \cdot 1 + \frac{1}{2} \cdot 0 & \otimes c \rightarrow \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{2}{3} & \nu_3(s_1) \\ = \frac{1}{2} & = \frac{1}{3} & \\ \otimes b \rightarrow \frac{1}{3} \cdot 1 + \frac{2}{3} \cdot \frac{2}{3} & d = \frac{2}{3} + \frac{1}{3} \cdot \frac{1}{4} & \nu_3(s_2) \\ = \frac{7}{9} & & \end{array}$$

